THE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF QUAKE MANAGEMENT POLICY IN CHINA: FROM TANGSHAN, SICHUAN, TO YUNNAN by Riskianingrum, Devi
149
THE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF QUAKE MANAGEMENT POLICY 
IN CHINA: FROM TANGSHAN, SICHUAN, TO YUNNAN 
Sejarah Kebijakan Penanganan Gempa di Cina: Studi Tangshan Sichuan 
dan Yunnan
Devi Riskianingrum
Research Center for Regional Resources  - Indonesian Institute of Sciences
praise _d@yahoo.com
Diterima: 10-11-2015   Direvisi:27-11-2015   Disetujui:8-12-2015
ABSTRAK
Gempa bumi merupakan bencana alam yang kerap memakan banyak korban jiwa dan memperlambat laju pere-
konomian di Tiongkok. Dua bencana gempa terbesar yang menimpa Tiongkok di abad ke-20 adalah Tangshan di 
tahun 1976 dan Sichuan di tahun 2008. Namun demikian, paling tidak terdapat empat gempa besar yang menimpa 
Tiongkok dalam lima tahun terakhir. Terkait dengan hal tersebut, manajemen penanganan bencana menjadi hal 
terpenting yang harus dikelola secara profesional oleh Pemerintah Tiongkok dalam rangka meminimalisir dampak 
dari bencana yang terjadi. Fokus dalam penelitian ini ialah berbagai kebijakan yang dikeluarkan oleh Pemerintah 
Tiongkok terkait dengan penanganan bencana gempa bumi dan efektifitas pelaksanaannya di lapangan. Beberapa 
penelitian mengenai manajemen bencana di Tiongkok telah dilakukan oleh Divisi Asia Pasifik, Pusat Penelitian 
Sumberdaya Regional LIPI sejak tahun 2010 sampai dengan tahun 2015. Beberapa hasil penelitian mengenai 
kebencanaan di Tingkok di antaranya adalah Disaster Management in China: History and Institutional Networks 
pada tahun 2010 dan the Representation of Sichuan Earthquake: State Control, Museum, and The Role of the Army 
pada tahun 2011. Selanjutnya, melalui wawancara mendalam dan studi literatur, artikel ini mendiskusikan dua 
pertanyaan utama, yaitu bagaimana sejarah pembentukan kebijakan terkait penanganan gempa di Tiongkok, dan 
bagaimana efektifitas pelaksanaan kebijakan tersebut pada empat gempa yang terjadi di Tiongkok, yaitu Tangshan 
(1976), Sichuan (2008), Qinghai (2010) dan Yunnan (2014). Tulisan ini mengklaim bahwa kebijakan dan aturan 
yang dikeluarkan pemerintah terkait dengan manajemen bencana di Tiongkok tergolong efektif dan sukses, namun 
demikian masih terdapat gap informasi dan minimnya koordinasi antar-institusi yang terkait di dalamnya. 
Kata Kunci: gempa Tangshan, gempa Sichuan, manajemen bencana, Tiongkok
ABSTRACT
The earthquake is one of the deadliest natural disasters that hinder economic progress in China. The two biggest 
20th century catastrophic quakes occurred in China are Tangshan in 1976 and Sichuan in 2008. Additionally, there 
are at least four massive earthquakes that struck China in the last five years. Hence, the disaster management is 
one of the main factor to be seriously administered by the Chinese government, both in the central level as well as 
to the regional and local level. Therefore, this paper aims to examine some policies issued by the Chinese govern-
ment in the context of earthquake management and its effectiveness. The discussions on disaster management in 
China have been deeply explored by Asia Pacific Research Team at The Research Center for Regional Resources 
LIPI and published under the title of Disaster Management in China: History and Institutional Networks in 2010. 
Furthermore, the research team also conducted a research on the Sichuan earthquake and published a monograph 
entitled The Representation of Sichuan Earthquake: State Control, Museum, and The Role of the Army. We conduct 
both some in-depth interview and literature review concerning the historical process of initiating some earthquake 
policies, and its practical effectiveness. This paper discusses the disaster management based on various policies 
and responses of two contemporary deadliest quake in Tangshan (1976) and Sichuan (2008), and two recent earth-
quakes occurred in Qinghai (2010) and Yunnan (2014). The paper claims that policies and regulations issued by the 
government in disaster management in China are successful to some extent though there is a lack of coordination, 
and some informational gaps in the existing institutions.
Keywords: Tangshan earthquake, Sichuan earthquake, disaster management, China.
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INTRODUCTION
China suffers from various types of a 
high frequency’s natural disasters. In particular, 
since the 1990s, the impact of material losses 
from natural disasters are increasing, and 
indeed it turns into one major factor that hinder 
economic progress in China (UNISDR 2005). 
The earthquake is one among those various 
factors. Since 1949, the earthquake has claimed 
more than 300,000 lives, caused 1 million injured 
and physical disabilities, and destroyed 10 
million homes, government buildings and public 
facilities. The two deadliest China’s catastrophic 
quakes in the 20th century are Tangshan in 1976 
and Sichuan in 2008. The magnitude of Tangshan 
earthquake was 7.8 on the Richter scale, where 
242,000 people are killed and 164,000 people are 
wounded. Meanwhile, the Sichuan earthquake, 
which occurred three months prior to the Olympic 
Games in 2008, caused a deep sorrow to most 
Chinese. The disaster killed approximately 
69.197 people, injured nearly 374.176 persons, 
and causing 18.263 people are missing (Zhang, 
2008, 6). Additionally, more than 15 million 
homes destroyed, implying 10 million homeless 
citizens, 1.5 million individuals are displaced, and 
entailing more than US$ 20 billion material loss. 
It is the worst natural disaster striking China since 
the Tangshan earthquake in 1976.
  Furthermore, the world has been 
witnessed five massive earthquakes that struck 
China in the last five years. Firstly, it was on 
August 30, 2008 in which case the southwestern 
region of Sichuan are struck off by the 6.1 Richter 
scale earthquake, and killing 38 people. In 2010, 
the earthquake shook the area of Yushu, Qinghai, 
with the magnitude of 7.1 on the Richter scales. 
1,944 people are killed as a consequence of the 
disaster. On September 7, 2012, an earthquake 
hit the region of southwest China, mainly in the 
border between Yunnan and Guizho provinces. 
Although the victims are not as many as in 2010, 
namely around 43 people are death, but more than 
100,000 people homeless and economic losses 
are quite serious. Subsequently, on April 20, 
2013, an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter 
scale jolted Sichuan, mainly in the city of Ya’an, 
southwest of Beijing. The death toll was nearly 
200 people and 2,600 people are injured. In 2014, 
Ludian region, in Yunnan province, rocked once 
again by the 6.1 magnitude quake. The quake took 
410 life and harmed 2,373 people (Tempo, 2013).
THE FORMATION OF 
MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING 
EARTHQUAKE POLICIES IN CHINA: 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Actually, the earthquakes that arise, either 
as a result of the movement of tectonic plates, 
as well as due to volcanic influence, do not 
harm humans. However, the earthquake ignites 
further damages, either in terms of infrastructural 
destruction or tsunami waves by which triggering 
many casualties. Stallings (2005, 263) as cited by 
Perry (2005, 8) conceives a disaster as a “social 
situation” caused by the destruction of non-routine 
due to the forces of nature. Therefore, the natural 
forces that caused the disaster eventually ruining 
normal activities, and furthermore, collapsing the 
social order that has been established. Therefore, 
some destructive earthquakes challenge the social 
system of affected society. This is as happened 
on Tangshan earthquake. Due to the hit, the city 
was falling apart and all social activities were 
collapsed. The city requires more than five years 
to restores its social order. As well as Tangshan, 
the Beichuan city, as a center of the quake 
epicenter, also faced a similar situation in which 
case all of its social activities are ruinous. The 
government decided to replace the city into a new 
area and left behind the previous spot. It took three 
years for the government to relocate and to re-
establish the social order in a new Beichuan city. 
As a means of lesson learned and memorial site, 
the ruined city is then transformed by the central 
government into a living museum (Carbonneau, 
2011; Liangen, 2010). Since the earthquake hits 
China repeatedly, an alert system to cope with 
the quake itself should be constructed and well 
prepared. As Jan Smith says “they are part of 
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nature, have happened in the past and will happen 
again…” (Smith, 2003). 
An academic explanation of the fragile 
China is the intra-plate tectonic energy which 
could be understood as an after-effect of the 
collision between the Eurasian plate and the Indo-
Australian plate in the Himalayas (Ross, 1984, 
774). Therefore, the disaster management is the 
main factor to be administered comprehensively 
by the Chinese government.
The discussions on disaster management 
in China have been explored by the Asia Pacific 
Research Team at the Research Center for 
Regional Resources LIPI in the project of Disaster 
Management in China: History and Institutional 
Networks in 2010. Furthermore, the research 
team also conducted a research on the Sichuan 
earthquake in the project of the Representation 
of Sichuan Earthquake: State Control, Museum, 
and The Role of the Army. Riskianingrum (2011) 
explains, that as a response of the tragedy, the 
Chinese government and the private entrepreneurs 
initiated the earthquake museum Anren and 
Beichuan in order to commemorating the 
catastrophe as well as for the lesson learns to 
the whole country. Therefore, this paper pays 
attention to the historical development of policies 
made by the Chinese government in the context 
of earthquake management and its effectiveness 
in coping them. The questions are: what is the 
historical process of initiating policies concerning 
earthquakes in China? Did those policies apply 
effectively? This paper discusses two deadliest 
quakes in modern time, namely Tangshan (1976) 
and Sichuan (2008) and examines two latest 
earthquakes occurred in China, Qinghai (2010) 
and Yunnan (2014) based on some literature 
reviews, several in-depth interviews, and an on-
site visit to Sichuan. 
Col (2007) explains that in 1976, prior to the 
Tangshan earthquake occurred, the government 
has set up an office for the earthquake monitoring, 
in charge of designing the proper procedures for 
rescuing people, training government officials, as 
well as simulating the earthquake mitigation to the 
local community. Furthermore, two weeks prior to 
the Tangshan earthquake, the local seismologists 
detect an abnormal signal in the Beijing-Tianjin-
Bohai-Zhangjiakou regions that they thought as 
a possible earthquake. Accordingly, on July 24, 
1976, the Qinglong party officials responded to 
the presentation of the seismologists, and held 
a preparatory meeting. Furthermore, the party 
officials strengthened the coordination system, 
information, and leadership among relevant 
agencies in order to monitor the situation. They 
also disseminated information to the public in 
the area of Qinglong about the probability of 
an earthquake, and placing medical devices 
in some spots. On 25 and 26 July, with the 
assistance from volunteers, the local government 
held an emergency meeting involving the local 
communities in the region to teach them how 
to escape if an earthquake occurs, including 
encouraging people not to close and lock their 
doors at night so that they could easily save 
themselves whenever they felt the tremor. As a 
result, when the earthquake struck Tangshan on 
July 28, 1976 at 3:42 AM, there was only one 
victim died in this region due to a heart attack 
despite 180,000 flattened buildings although the 
area was quite close to the epicenter of the quake 
(Col, 2007; Lo, 2014, xiii-xv). 
This condition shows the responsive action 
of Qinglong’s government, as they are aware with 
the potential earthquake, has saved many lives. 
Beside providing counseling and education on 
how to deal with earthquakes, the Qinglong’s 
government actions ranged from conducting the 
geological data collection to predict the strength of 
earthquake, establishing some seismology offices 
in the region in order to monitor the movement 
of the earth, and publishing some regulations on 
the rescue and evacuation activities during the 
earthquake. Moreover, the existence of public 
awareness about the earthquake, in which case 
they followed the instructions given by the 
local government, has saved them from deathly 
earthquake (Lo, 2014). Therefore, it could be 
concluded that the positive cooperation between 
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the local government, society and geologists is 
effective in coping the locals with the earthquake, 
and reducing the number of victims.
At the beginning of its establishment in 
1949, the Chinese government mostly focused 
on the welfare of its people. Under the reign 
of Mao, the Chinese government tried to align 
themselves with other developed countries 
through various economic policies, such as 
land reform, Anti-Movement Three (San Fan) 
and Anti-Movement Five (Wu Fan). Those 
policies are essentially against corruption and 
bureaucratic inefficiency, and suppressing the 
five kinds of crimes, namely bribery, not paying 
taxes, stealing the state funds, deceiving contracts 
with the government, and misusing the economic 
information of state property. Furthermore, Mao 
also focused on developing heavy industry in 
order to generate the Chinese economy through 
massive industrialization and exploiting the 
cheap labor. This is well known by the people as 
the Great Leap Forward (Meisner, 1998 p. 80-
90). Despite the success of these programs, the 
economic and political issues still be the main 
purpose of Mao’s administration. Unfortunately, 
research and disaster management are put as 
the subordinate subjects compared to those two 
previous issues. Such thing is obviously shown 
by the small effort to study natural disasters, 
particularly earthquakes, in Mao’s administration 
(Ross, 1984). 
At the ear ly decades of  the PRC 
establishment, the Chinese government paid 
attention to the disastrous policy mainly focusing 
on prevention and protection. The issue of post-
disaster relief and reconstruction are neglected 
by the government at the time. On the one hand, 
as a token of protective and preventing policies, 
the Chinese government relied on its military 
forces, in which case they are much more prepared 
to tackle the political and economic problems 
instead of natural disasters. On the other hand, as 
a token of post-disaster management, the central 
government provided tax incentives and increased 
the food supply from the central to the affected 
area (Ross, 1984, 776).
The central government did not provide 
sufficient support to the study and research on 
earthquake including its disaster management. 
A token of their effort was founding some 
seismological observation stations in some 
earthquake-prone areas.  Indeed, Mao’s 
administration rapidly developed such stations 
from two stations in 1949 up to 24 stations in 1958 
(Ross, 1984). Furthermore, the government also 
developed a measurement method based on the 
Chinese traditional calculation. This is well known 
by the people as the scale of twelve degrees. 
This calculation applies in the architecture and 
engineering as well. Twelve degrees scale is a way 
of measuring the intensity of the shock at some 
certain points. This causes the shock scale of the 
earthquake varies from one region to another, 
depending on the distance and other factors. By 
contrast, the international community uses the 
Richter scale for the earthquakes measurement. 
For example, the Tangshan earthquake in 1976 
showed 7.8 on the Richter scale, while according 
to the twelve degree scale of Chinese, the 
earthquake in Tangshan is XI and it is VIII in 
Beijing. Different figures of the same earthquake 
are caused by the distance between Tangshan and 
Beijing. Both cities are far enough so that the 
shaking is smaller in Beijing (Ross, 1984). 
The application of twelve degree scale in 
architecture and industry shows the development 
of research and observational activities of the 
government in adjusting with their own natural 
condition. Unfortunately, this effort did not 
work smoothly due to inadequate financial 
support and the strong political control in China. 
Consequently, no significant improvement of 
awareness to anticipate the threats of earthquake 
in China. It is obviously shown by the lack of 
seismological data and its classification in both 
planning and developing buildings. This is 
proven by a total destruction of some buildings in 
Tangshan right after the earthquake (Ross, 1984).
 In the period of 1966 to 1976, China 
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is rocked by 14 times earthquakes where the 
averages were above 7.0 on the Richter scale. 
These particular facts attracted the central 
government’s attention about the necessity to take 
preventive measures by establishing institutions 
that work on how to anticipate earthquakes.
The first earthquake observation institution 
in China is established under the auspices of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences. Then, following 
the earthquake in Xingtai in 1966, Mao’s 
government established the seismic maintenance 
agency under the supervision of the National 
Commission on Science and Technology and the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences. The new task force 
established and named as the Central Task Force 
of Earthquake of the Chinese Communist Party, 
right after China is rocked by a 7.4 magnitude 
earthquake hitting Bohai Bay region on July 
18, 1969. Based on the earthquake coming in a 
row, the central government decided to establish 
a national specialized agency on earthquake 
management namely the National Earthquake 
Bureau. The agency was officially under the 
coordination of central government in 1975. At 
that time, China is the only country that established 
the administrative institutions of seismicity under 
a central coordination. This bureau is renamed 
in 1998 as the China Earthquake Administration 
(Bai, 2010).
In addition, the government’s attention to 
the earthquake is also shown by their effort in 
making seismic intensity maps or the Seismic 
Intensity Zoning Map at the end of the 1950s. 
Thus, the second and the third edition of the 
maps were published in 1977 and 1992 with 
some improvements in various aspects. While the 
Chinese seismology department was developing 
the scientific method of earthquake prediction, 
community members are encouraged by the 
government to predict earthquakes based on their 
experiences. Through this method, the Chinese 
managed to conduct a precise prediction of several 
earthquakes, such as the Haicheng earthquake in 
1975, Longlin earthquake in 1976, and Songpan 
earthquake in 1976 (Yi, et.al. 2012, p. 297). 
Actually the Tangshan earthquake has predicted 
though the Chinese government was wrong in 
measuring its strength. It is estimated to be only 
V of twelve degrees scale but it reached the value 
VIII-XI (Lo, xv).
Currently, all Chinese local governments as 
well as all earthquake-prone areas have their own 
local offices of Earthquake Administration. The 
expansion of tasks is carried out by the agency in 
order to strengthen the local government readiness 
against earthquakes. There are 11 main tasks of the 
bureau, namely (i) to formulate and to implement 
national strategies, guidelines, regulations, and 
laws which are relevant to the earthquake disaster 
readiness and mitigation; (ii) to organize and to 
plan a national program for disaster preparation 
and the earthquake mitigation, and making the 
emergency response plan against some destructive 
earthquakes, as well as setting up a registration 
system and guidelines related to the readiness 
and earthquake prediction; (iii) formulating 
a national seismic intensity zone map as well 
as a map of the strong ground motion zone 
parameters, running the seismic safety evaluation, 
and determining the level of seismic fortification 
(seismic fortification levels); (iv) providing 
supervisions and doing inspections of the tasks 
related to the earthquake disaster preparedness 
in accordance with the regulation in the Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Protecting 
Against and mitigating Earthquake Disasters; 
(v) implementing a dual-government system, 
be centered on the CEA, in the provincial and 
municipal earthquake and building management 
systems and financial plans, and guiding staff in 
the city and local level; (vi) monitoring nationally 
and periodically, and regulating various activities 
concerning earthquake predictions, and capturing 
and reporting the tendency of seismic conditions, 
proposing some necessary actions to the central 
government, and in return, applying those actions 
insofar as they are approved by the central 
government; (vii) serving as the command center 
of the earthquake disaster relief, and reporting 
the actual condition to the central government; 
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(viii) to conduct research and collaboration with 
various national and international institutions 
associated with the earthquake; (ix) providing 
guidance for educating the locals and publishing 
all information about earthquakes ranged from 
the locals readiness to face earthquakes and 
mitigation; (x) to control and to administer the 
use of the earthquake disaster relief funds, both 
infrastructure and other projects; (xi) carry out 
all tasks ordered by the central government. 
(English1, 2005).
Furthermore, each CEA office is equipped 
with a monitoring system and earthquake 
prediction. The system consists of digital seismic 
observation networks, which ranged from 48 
seismic stations, 23 digital seismic telematics at the 
provincial level, and 25 sustained observations, as 
well as more than 400 observation stations at the 
local level (Yi, et.al., 2012). In order to socialize 
the new requirements of seismic fortification, 
in 2001, China released the fourth edition of 
the Seismic Ground Motion Parameter Zoning 
Map with the scale of 1: 4 million. This edition 
adopts a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis 
and prefers the risk probability level exceeding 
10% in the 50 years as a criterion to the seismic 
zoning fortification map. The fourth edition of 
seismic zoning map, which is prone to be more 
academic and advanced, shows that the theory 
and application of seismic zoning in China has 
been conformed to the international standards 
(Yi, et.al., 2012).
In 2011, the office of China Earthquake 
Administration (CEA) issued a guideline to cope 
the earthquake with its basic principle, to wit, to 
reduce casualties and property losses caused by 
the earthquake at maximum level. The purpose 
of these guidelines is to improve the ability of 
the country to predict earthquakes and mitigate 
its effects through some fancy technology and 
innovation, as well as comprehensive training 
for rescuing workers and the improvement of 
social management. The government through 
all CEA calls for increasing professionalism in 
the rescue efforts, and promoting the scientific 
and technical innovations to improve their 
abilities in prognosticating earthquakes and the 
response management (Ma, 2013). Associated 
with the policy, the Chinese government since 
1949 to 2010 have issued at least 100 laws 
and decrees related to the prevention and 
mitigation of disasters, including earthquakes. 
One aspect of those regulations is the law and 
regulations of geological disasters. These laws 
ranged from the Law of the PRC on Protecting 
Against and mitigating Earthquake Disasters; 
Rapid Report Regulation of the Situation 
of the Earthquake; Work Rules of Seismic 
Losses Assessment; Work System of Earthquake 
Emergency Inspections; Emergency Ordinance of 
Destructive Earthquake; Management Regulation 
of Earthquake Predictions; Protection Ordinance 
of Facilities for Earthquake Monitoring and 
Environment for Seismicity Observations; and 
Management Methods of Geological Disaster 
Prevention (Yi et. al., 302).
The implementation of earthquake risk 
reduction and prevention is officially governed by 
a regulation adopted by the Chinese government 
in 1988. Later in 1994, the government issued 
some regulations supporting the improvement 
of seismic monitoring facilities by issuing 
specific a regulation called the Act for Facilities 
of Earthquake Monitoring and Environmental 
Conditions of Earthquake Observation. The 
step is taken in order to comprehensively and 
continuously conduct the seismic observation 
activities as a benchmark for the prevention 
and mitigation activities. Upon the occurrence 
of a large earthquake in Kobe, Japan in 1995, 
the Chinese government responded by issuing a 
regulation called as the Emergency Response Act 
for Destructive Earthquake. The action is based 
on the alertness that a similar earthquake could 
occur in China. Moreover, the government made 
a regulation named as the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Earthquake Prevention 
and Disaster Reduction where it officially came 
into effect on December 29, 1997 and be applied 
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in March 1998. This regulation provides a legal 
certainty for protecting the CEA from various 
interventions that may interrupt the earthquake 
disaster management tasks (www.earthquake.tier.
org.tw/document/sedmess/s11.pdf).
Entering a new millennium, China reformed 
once again the rules related to the management of 
the earthquake by which the government issued 
Regulations on the Prevention and Control of 
Geological Disasters in 2003. This is followed by 
another rule called Regulations on the Handling 
of Destructive Earthquake Emergencies in 2005. 
However, during the Wenchuan earthquake 
in 2008, the government re-issued a new 
regulation for handling of the impacts of such 
particular earthquake, namely the Regulations 
on Post-Wenchuan Earthquake Restoration and 
Reconstruction. In particular, this regulation is 
issued by the government in order to accelerate 
the recovery of communities and infrastructure 
right after the Wenchuan earthquake (Pandey, 
2012, 47-48).
SEVERAL CASES ON EARTHQUAKE 
MANAGEMENT RESCUE: FROM 
TANGSHAN TO LUDIAN 
Related to disaster management in China, 
in November 2003, the Chinese government 
endorsed the “Emergency Law” but it has 
not been widely publicized. Then, these rules 
are amended in March 2004 by shifting the 
terminology of ‘martial law’ to ‘emergency law.’ 
Next, in December 2005, China established the 
Emergency Management Office (EMO) and start 
developing a new EM system. Subsequently, the 
central government issued a Master State Plan 
for Rapid Response to Public Emergencies in 
January 2006. The law was finally passed into 
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Emergency Responses on August 30, 2007, and 
came into effect on November 1, 2007. This law is 
a major milestone in China’s systemic emergency 
management. Along with this regulation, the 
emergency management in China enjoys a 
legal support from all levels of authority, from 
the central government to the local level. Ever 
since then, the Chinese government began to 
establish various forms of emergency plans 
based on this framework. In March 2009, there 
are approximately 51 national-level emergency 
plans have been developed. In addition, both 
138 nationally owned companies and all mining 
and chemical related companies have developed 
emergency plans (Bai, 2010).
The operational mechanism of disaster 
management in China could be summarized as 
follows: a unified leadership, tiered responses 
and functional divisions, based on the local 
government and central government supports. 
Unified leadership means the government 
issued a policy, some regulations and planning, 
and then make decisions, orders, supervisions 
and coordination in order to implement the 
benchmark of disaster mitigation (Yi et.al., 2012. 
296). Related to this, the Chinese government 
through the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the 
National Comprehensive Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) in 
2011 where the earthquake response, relief and 
preparedness are included into such plan.
Tangshan 1976
The 1976 Tangshan’s disaster relief is 
inevitably slow due to President Mao decided to 
close the information and the region from foreign 
aid, and encouraging his fellow citizens to hold 
the principle of Bai no date or independence. 
Therefore, Tangshan disaster relief depends 
only on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) and medical forces being set up by the 
government. The first aid provided by the central 
government through the Central Disaster Relief 
is sending 100,000 troops and 20,000 medical 
staff to work hand in hand in the affected areas. 
At that time, medical forces are divided into three 
parts. Firstly, medical staff who are responsible to 
provide the first aid needed by victims. Secondly, 
they who served as a mobile medical staff readily 
to conduct some medical treatments on the spot, 
such as surgeries. Thirdly, they who worked 
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at hospitals and in some regions around the 
earthquake (Amri, 2010).
Tangshan’s rescue and relief acts showed 
up China’s unpreparedness both in regulations 
and its actions while dealing with the quake. 
Actually, at the beginning of 1976 there has been 
a signal indicating the occurrence of a potential 
large earthquake, but the Tangshan government 
preferred to wait for a clearer sign indication, such 
as what have happened in Haicheng earthquake. 
Unfortunately, it was not a sign that appear but 
rather a massive earthquake that occurred on 
the first place; hence there was not any warning 
to society from the government. At that time, 
the government was hesitate to issue a warning 
because at that time Tangshan was the center of 
industry and economy, which if there were a fake 
alarm, then it could affect their economy. This 
indicated that China’s policies and regulations 
are totally based on observation, and the early 
warning of earthquakes was still incomplete, and 
not fully supported by the local government (Ross, 
1984, 783-784).
Another point concerning the quake was the 
weakness of building construction in Tangshan. 
Consequently, most of existing buildings, 
including a new building less than a year prior to 
the quake, are demolished by the earthquake. In 
fact, the government clearly issuing regulations 
and policies regarding the building safety 
standards related to the earthquake disaster alerts. 
In reality, many of these buildings did not meet 
the criterion of building security. This suggests 
that the availability of regulation in China is not 
obeyed yet by various sectors (Ross, 1984, 785).
Wenchuan 2008
Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 was one of 
the great disasters in the 20th century that hit 
China. Actually, China’s quake measurement tools 
were classified fancy at that time. During this 
period, China already equipped with a network of 
Early Warning System (ESW); Network Disaster 
Remote-sensing Monitoring System (DRMS) 
that uses small satellites named Constellation 
A and B; and has Earthquake Monitoring and 
Forecasting System (EMFs) that collected and 
analyzed data provided by 937 permanent seismic 
stations and 1,000 seismic stations located 
throughout the region. In addition, China has 
also established approximately 1,300 earthquake 
precursor observation stations throughout the 
region. According to a source, the Chinese 
ESW station previously showed a blink signal 
in a couple of weeks prior to the earthquake. 
However, it appeared to be an oversight so that 
this earthquake implied approximately 80,000 
deaths and economic losses of up to 85 million 
US dollars (Pandey, 2012. 45).
CEA received information about the 
Wenchuan earthquake from the China Earthquake 
Network Center shortly after the earthquake, and 
immediately run the pre-disaster regulations. CEA 
sent the first wave of rescue forces and medical 
teams to the affected area and work closely 
with the head office of disaster management. 
They immediately conducted a small team to 
take necessary steps for supporting the disaster 
management. Along with the assistances of 
military forces, the central government led by 
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao formed 8 working 
committees consists of rescue and assistance 
units, monitoring and forecast units, medical 
and health services, housing reconstruction 
teams, infrastructure rehabilitation units, public 
order units, and news and publications teams. 
All government sectors mutually cooperated 
such as the interior ministry, the ministry of 
finance, the ministry of transportation and 
other ministries to executed the pre-disaster 
regulations, to established working committee, 
and to coordinated with their counterparts in 
the disaster management. Given the magnitude 
of the disaster, the government categorized 
the disaster management at level II, where the 
provincial governments of the affected region 
led all rescue activities, and CEA organized and 
coordinated all assistances under the control of 
central government.
Previously, only the military and the 
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Chinese Red Cross are given the access to the 
worst affected areas. As well as managing of 
Tangshan, the government forbade both the local 
and foreign non-governmental organizations 
to approach the area even though they already 
have a lot of resources, either volunteers or 
logistics. In contrast to Tangshan, both local and 
international NGOs could entered the worst hit 
areas in Wenchuan right after a research group 
called the Chengdu Urban Rivers conducted 
some lobby and intensive discussions with the 
central government, and ensuring that foreign 
donors would not interfere the political stability 
in China. As a result of this incident, the Chinese 
government had increasingly opened its door 
to foreigners and foreign donors since Deng 
Xiaoping administration (Amri, 2010).
Yushu, Qinghai 2010
On 14 April 2010, quake rocked China once 
again, where this time it struck the area of  Yushu 
in Qinghai Province. The quake struck at 7:46 
am with a magnitude of 7.1 on the Richter scale. 
Yushu is located in the mountainous area where 
it is the main hurdle against the government’s 
rescue and aid operations. Forty minutes after 
the disaster, the government and the Chinese 
Qinghai Earthquake Administration issued a 
preplanned Earthquake Response Plan. Based 
on the National Comprehensive Plan for Public 
Emergencies, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(Ministry of Civil Affairs or MCA) and the CEA 
preceded the level IV disaster management at 
8:30 local time. However, due to the increasing 
number of deaths, the regulation is raised to the 
level I at noon that is approved by the deputy 
Prime Minister, Huiliangyu. National rescue 
team arrived at the epicenter of the quake eleven 
hours after the first shock. The local government 
immediately established seven working groups, 
and initiated disaster office which operates 24 
hours ever since then. Fortunately, electricity and 
airports, located 30 minutes from the location, 
were still operating well so that all rescued efforts 
could reach the epicenter. MCA through CEA 
immediately allocated 20,000 tents and 50,000 
coats and blankets, as well as 500 sets of toilets 
to be sent to the worst affected areas. 
In the process of disaster mitigation in 
Yushu there were some technical obstacles. 
For instance, extreme temperature in the area 
between day and night, causing many rescue 
forces suffered some illness. Furthermore, since 
most of the epicenter was in the region of Tibet, 
which 93% were Tibetan ethnic; the language was 
another hurdle to the rescue team. The rescue team 
spoke Mandarin but local Tibet residents spoke 
Tibetan. Hence they sometimes faced difficulties 
to communicate one another.
 Several ministries that involved in the 
process of rescue and reconstruction on Yushu 
earthquake are the Ministry of Railways, Ministry 
of Education, Ministry of Finance and Trade and 
the Chinese Red Cross. Furthermore, the Ministry 
of Interior immediately initiated a policy related 
to the short-term and long-term reconstruction for 
the areas affected by the earthquake, including the 
provision of temporary shelters, daily assistance 
funds, and apparels. A regulation governing 
the procedure for fund-raising and assistance 
for victims of Yushu is issued by China’s 
Ministry of Home Affairs (MCA). This is done 
in order to prevent the misuse of public funds by 
irresponsible actors as be happened in the case 
of mitigating the Sichuan earthquake in 2008. In 
addition, it is also done in order to ensure that any 
incoming aid could be directly delivered to the 
beneficiary in disaster locations through a strict 
supervision, as well as prohibiting the entry of 
unauthorized persons into the disaster sites (Tao 
and Van de Welle, 2013).
Ludian, Yunnan 2014
An earthquake measuring 6.1 magnitudes 
struck the southwest Yunnan Province, China, on 
Sunday, August 3, 2014. According to the USGS 
(US Geological Survey), the earthquake occurred 
at 16:30 local time. The earthquake is centered in 
1 mile northwest town Wenping at a depth of 10 
kilometers. The epicenter was in Longtoushan 
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Township in Ludian County. This region has a 
fairly difficult terrain with steep hills and narrow 
streets. The latest news said that the earthquake 
has caused 617 people died, and more than 240 
people were injured, and more than 80,000 houses 
were destroyed (DMCDD, 2014).
The Chinese premier,  Li Keqiang, 
immediately flew to the location and personally 
coordinated with the CEA and the local military. 
Rescue forces are sent directly from nearby 
provinces in order to save thousands of lives 
from the risky effects of earthquake such as the 
overflow of Kraal River. Under the coordination 
of Prime Minister, 2,825 special forces, 1,500 
policemen, and 937 firefighters are deployed to the 
epicenter in order to assist the rescue operation. 
By the local CEA, the earthquake is considered 
as the level IV. However, regarding the death tolls 
was increased; weather conditions were getting 
worse; Kraal River would potentially drown the 
city; the disaster management level is raised to 
level III by the CEA (Earthquake-Report, 2014).
President Xi Jinping ordered to prioritize 
injured people, helped the establishment of 
shelters, and fulfilled their basic needs. 18,000 
troops and rescue teams deployed to seek victims 
trapped on debris. Yunnan Red Cross allocated 50 
folding beds, 50 blankets and 10 tents. Chinese 
Red Cross provided 200 blankets, 200 coats and 
20 tents, while Hong Kong Red Cross distributed 
100 emergency relief kits. All of these aids are 
provided by the government within 24 hours 
right after the earthquake is fitted with high-tech 
equipment and well-educated rescue forces. The 
rapid response of central government has earned 
positive appreciation from the international 
communities By now, the responsive system of 
disaster management in China is regarded as one 
of the best in the world, whereby the government 
is responsive to handle disasters, providing 
information to the public continuously in every 
single hour, and regulating the influx of donations 
for earthquake victims. This is also evidenced by 
the influx of donations from Indonesia to Ludian 
residents through Dompet Dhuafa as a token of 
solidarity given by the Indonesians (Earthquake-
Report, 2014). It could be summarized that the 
single-style policies be applied by the Chinese 
government on disaster management is proven 
to be quite effective in dealing with disasters and 
disaster risk reduction, particularly in the case of 
mitigation.
CONCLUSION
After series of significant efforts, the Chinese 
government is finally able to build a system that is 
relatively comprehensive and integrated into the 
disaster management, especially after endorsing 
the policy of the State Emergency Plan System, 
and enacted various laws relating to disaster 
management. Furthermore, the government also 
established various institutions and organizations 
as well as making the working mechanism that 
is used for monitoring, preventing, mitigating, 
responding, and to do the disaster recovery. 
However, the disaster emergency management 
system in China still faces up many challenges, 
namely the disharmonious coordination among 
agencies and institutions. This is triggered by 
different orientations and priorities among those 
institutions. Most institutions are responsible to 
proceed the disaster management that has been 
designed to suffice various needs, and to deliver 
different policies. Hence, it is difficult for them 
to coordinating the agenda and the existing 
strategies. Furthermore, the presence of various 
organizations and institutions turn into barriers 
in accessing and communicating information 
effectively and timely. Instead, information is the 
main key of success for a disaster management 
especially in making some precise decisions. 
Thus, if there is a gap in the dissemination of 
information, it would hinder the work of an 
institution. Therefore, a commitment between 
each institution to share information and to 
work together in order to carry out the disaster 
management policies set by the government is 
inevitably needed.
 Considering the effectiveness of 
earthquake mitigation in China, it could be 
|  159Devi Riskianingrum  | The Historical Overview of Quake Management Policy in China:...
said that policies and regulations issued by the 
government in disaster management in China was 
a success. Although it was full of political intrigues 
during the Tangshan mitigation, the Wenchuan 
mitigation has a different story in which case 
the information disclosure occurred in China to 
some extent. Furthermore, two years gap between 
the Wenchuan and Yushu earthquakes showed 
some positive developments in implementing 
policies and accelerating responses to the latter 
disaster. The Chinese Government appeared 
to learn something from the management of 
Wenchuan earthquake. Afterwards, they already 
owned some standardized and institutionalized 
rules whenever they mitigated Yushu and Ludian 
earthquakes, where it was much more efficient 
and structured in facing a critical moment of 
future disasters. In addition, the government 
also put sufficient investment for developing 
the disaster management as shown by the latest 
high-tech rescue equipment. The combination 
between fancy technology and professional 
rescued forces is obviously seen on the mitigation 
of Yushu and Ludian earthquakes. In addition, 
the government was also implementing the rules 
relating to assistance for victims of Yushu and 
Ludian earthquake, including the rules of storage 
and logistics. This is done by the government 
right after the occurrence of a mess and some 
frauds concerning logistic assistance during the 
Wenchuan earthquake mitigation. In a nutshell, 
the policy and regulatory disaster management 
in China, in terms of rescue and the disaster aids, 
has integrated well although there is a lack of 
coordination and some information gaps in the 
existing institutions.
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